The role of putable bonds as a defense against takeovers and as protection for investors against market and event risk has been appreciated in the literature, but the threatening power of put bondholders | the ability to induce a nancial crisis | has largely been ignored. In times of low liquidity for a rm, put bondholders can threaten to either force the company i n to a reorganization or to raise its borrowing costs. This threatening power implies that there is a dierence between the intrinsic and strategic value of the option. Using recent results in bargaining theory, I solve for the strategic values of these options at the time of the triggering of the put. The theory is applicable both to cases where the bonds are held closely by a few institutional investors or the bonds are widely held by small market participants. It will be seen that the strategic values of players will depend on the following`state' variables at the time of the put: (1) The size of the each lender's holding of the company's debt, (2) The size of the`eectively' liquid assets of the company relative to the amount of putable debt outstanding, (3) The costs of bankruptcy, and (4) The prices of all nancial assets at the time the put options are triggered. Prior to the crisis all nancial assets are priced in a continous-time framework when interest rates follow the Vasicek process and rm's debtholders are subject to a sharp price decline due to an LBO. The model is calibrated to one such recent crisis | that of Kmart Corp.
Introduction
Poison put bonds rst became popular in the late 1980s after a series of leveraged buyout transactions (LBOs) had reduced the values of target company's debtholders. They have remained popular in the 1990s with a large value of such bonds issued even before a new wave of takeover activity began in 1994. Investors hungry for yield have increased their appetite for speculative grade bonds, but have demanded protection against large downside risks. We estimate that poison puts have accounted for about 12 percent of all bonds issued by U.S. nonnancial companies in the 1990s. While the roles of poison puts as anti-takeover defenses and as providing investors protection against event-risk (see for example, Crabbe 1991, Cook and Easterwood 1994 ) the threatening power of poison put bondholders | the ability to induce a nancial crisis | has largely been ignored. In times of low liquidity for the rm, put bondholders can threaten to either force the company i n to a reorganization or raise its borrowing costs. This gives their bonds a strategic value in addition to the intrinsic value of the options. One such nancial crisis is described next.
In December 1995, following several quarters of weak sales, Kmart Corp. came on the brink of a bankruptcy ling: Their problems stemmed from the possible exercise of $550 million of poison put bonds outstanding, which allowed holders to sell back, or`put' the notes back to the retailer, if the rating on the company's senior debt { as determined by either Standard and Poor's or Moody's { fell below i n v estment grade. The putable debt was held by t w o sets of institutional lenders { banks and insurance companies { and was not publicly traded. Despite having more than $1 billion in cash and other marketable securities, Kmart was prohibited by c o v enants in its bank debt from accelerating payment on more than $100 million of the putable debt. Exercise of the options, therefore, would force Kmart it into a bankruptcy ling. In December, the retailer's debt was rated two notches above junk status at`BBB' by Standard and Poor's and Baa2' by Moody's. Kmart reached a settlement with the lenders, oering insurance companies that held the putable bonds a lump sum to surrender their options. While the settlement amount is unknown, it was rumored in certain press reports that a total of $98 million was paid to putable bondholders and that an insurance company w as oered ve times as much per dollar as banks holding similar bonds. 1 The settlement was accepted by bondholders and Kmart's shares soared 27 percent following the retailer's agreement with holders.
Several market imperfections inherent in the options transaction imply that there is dierence between the intrinsic and the strategic value of the option. The former is the present discounted value under an equivalent martingale measure. The latter results due to bondholders having some threatening power on the rm in a time of nancial crisis. The strategic values paid in informal bargaining situations to creditors are determined through bargaining between the rm and the putable bondholders. Some of the market imperfections are: (i) the bonds are not publicly traded, (ii) one large bondholder held a fth of the face value outstanding and several (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) smaller bondholders held the remainder, (iii) the rm is liquidity constrained and is prohibited by c o v enants to renance the put debt costlessly and (iv) there are direct (and perhaps indirect) costs of bankruptcy.
The value of dierent bondholders options in such situations depends on their bargaining positions. Using recent results in N-person multilateral bargaining theory (Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) ), I solve for the strategic values of these options. The solution of the non-cooperative game coincides with a cooperative game theory concept | the Shapley Value | and assigns a strategic value to each player equal to his expected marginal value. The expectation is with respect to the uniform measure over all coalitions that can potentially be formed. In the model described, the`probability' of each bondholder being in a threatening coalition is shown to be a function of the eective liquidity-to-putable debt ratio of the rm. It is shown that the strategic values of dierent sized bondholders are dierent and dier signicantly from the intrinsic values of these options. Even when the number of bondholders increases to innity, the two v alues will not coincide for an eective liquidity-to-putable debt ratio less than one. It will be seen that the strategic values of players will depend on the following variables at the time of negotiations: (1) The size of the each lender's holding of the company's debt, (2) The size of the`eectively' liquid assets of the company relative to the amount of putable debt outstanding, (3) The expected costs of bankruptcy, and (4) The value of nonputable bonds and equity.
Prior to the crisis, we formulate the prices of all nancial assets in a frictionless framework (no liquidity problems). It is assumed that interest rates follow the Vasicek (1977) process and that the rm les for bankruptcy (defaults) when the value of its assets hits a lower bound. The default boundary depends on the face value of all debts outstanding and exogenously given recovery rates of each class of liabilities. The rm is subject to an LBO, which raises the amount of its junior debt and hence leads to an increase in the default boundary. Therefore, even though the asset process is continuous, the prices of bonds are subject to sharp decreases in the event of an LBO. We will note that such a model is consistent with the observed high spreads for bonds with short maturities. We then calculate rating boundaries for the asset value at which the poison puts can be exercised; at these boundaries the probabilities of default match the default probabilities for the put-triggering rating (for example, Ba in the case of Kmart) for bonds rated by Moody's. The values of the poison puts prior to the crisis, are the solution of a partial dierential equation with boundary conditions (at the rating boundaries) determined by the bargaining solution as discussed above.
The violation of absolute priority in debt contracts (see for example Franks and Torous 1989 ) is an indicator of strategic behavior among various creditors of the rm in and before bankruptcy. Several recent papers have modeled the strategic behavior and its impact on bond valuation. In Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and in Mella-Berral and Perraudin (1997) the rm is able to make take-it-or-leave-it oers to bondholders at the time coupons and principal is due. They show that if the rm is unconcerned about reputational concerns in their ability to issue future debt, then its oers a strategic debt service, which in many situations is smaller than the promised sums. We shall abstract from such behavior by borrowers by assuming that rms must oer bonds periodically and do not want to harm their reputations. In addition, we model multilateral bargaining with alternating oers, a framework in which the rst-mover advantage is small when the players are patient (or the costs of delay are small). Aivazian and Callen (1983) proposed the Shapley Value as the solution to the bargaining problem between shareholders and bondholders; Bergman and Callen (1991) used the alternating oers framework of Rubinstein (1982) as the solution. Both papers assume that bondholders bargain jointly as a group with shareholders in a 2-person game. Because one on our goals is to study the relative strategic value of large and small creditors we formulate an N-person game. The bargaining solution coincides with the Shapley value, but we point to an explicit non-cooperative game with alternating oers that has the Shapley Value as its unique solution. In addition, we price strategic value of bondholders in an environment with stochastic interest rates. Dunn and Spatt (1984) report and price strategic value in the sinking fund bond market; hoarders attempt to corner the market for the rm's bonds, so that repurchases from the open market are unavailable. They then demand payments greater than face value from the rm.
The plan for the paper is as follows: General Characteristics of the Put Bond Market are in Section 2. In Section 3, nonputable bonds are priced in a frictionless framework in which the target rm's debt is subject to a sharp price decline due to an LBO. In Section 4, the capital structure of the rm with poison puts is described, and the frictionless structure is adjusted to incorporate the timing and rules of the bargaining game that arises when covenants in poison puts are violated. In Section 5, intrinsic and strategic values for poison put options are dened. Strategic values are solved for when the putable debt is divided equally among an arbitrary number of bondholders in Section 6, and when one large bondholder holds a signicant amount of the debt in Section 7. The model is calibrated to Kmart's situation in Section 8. The pricing of two dierent v ariants of poison puts at the time of issuance is in Section 9. The conclusion and some implications are in Section 10.
Acquisition Activity and the Poison Put Bond Market
After a relatively quiet period in the early 1990s, a new wave of merger activity in the nonnancial sector began in 1994, and has been grown in strength since then. Bolstered by the purchase of small companies, the number of deals completed has increased steadily over the past 12 years. However, the aggregate value of targets acquired displays two distinct waves (Figure 2 , top panels); the aggregate value of targets acquired was about $130 billion per year in 1984-1989, sank to about $50 billion in 1990-1993 , and has been about $220 billion from 1994-1997.
There are some major dierences in the acquisitions consummated in the two w a v es. In the wave o f the 1980s cash was the dominant mode of nancing the purchase targets, mostly nanced by a large increase in acquirers' debts. In the current w a v e, more than half the consideration oered to targets' shareholders has been in the stock of the acquirer. This feature is displayed in the top right panel of Figure 2 : the dark portion in the top right panel represents the equity of the target company retired as a result of the acquisition; the remainder of the deal value was paid in the stock of the acquirer. Deals in which the stock o f public companies was purchased by leveraged buyout rms and private investor groups | classied as LBOs | w ere an important phenomenon in the 1980s, accounting for 30 percent of the deal value (Figure 2 middle panels). In contrast, their role in the current w a v e has been almost negligible. The academic literature has identied two important motivations for leveraged buyouts and hostile acquisitions: reducing incentive and agency cost problems between management and shareholders, and improving the operating performance of the targets, often through extensive asset sales. The smaller share of such deals in the current merger wave i s in line with the view that nonnancial corporations have generally been operating more eciently, and that shareholders gains in the bull market have been at or above expectations. Concomitantly, the percentage of deals classied as hostile has dropped sharply from almost 30 percent in the 1980s to less than 8 percent i n the current w a v e and the percentage of intra-industry deals has risen substantially from about 41 percent t o 66 percent. The larger percentage in the current w a v e reects both the smaller role of nancial buyers and the greater number of strategic combinations among rms in the same or related businesses.
Despite the large number of friendly stock mergers in the 1990s, almost $100 billion of nonnancial equity has been retired from cash deals each y ear since 1994. The debts of several of the rms involved in deals with signicant equity retirements have been downgraded by the rating agencies. While the number of LBOs completed recently has been small, funds raised by non-venture private equity i n v estors | which include specialist LBO rms | have continued to grow rapidly: such funds drew in about $50 billion in 1995 and 1996, and increased that total by another $20 billion in the rst half of 1997 (Figure 2 , bottom left panel). A more complete discussion of these funds can be obtained in Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1997) . Press reports indicate that at least four large rms drew in funds in the $3-6 billion range in the rst half of 1997. Several practitioners have noted that buyout rms will likely make substantial purchases in the event of a signicant market correction. The enhanced acquisition activity among nonnancial rms with credit quality implications, and the impending threat of a leveraged buyout has prompted robust issuance of poison put bonds in the 1990s (Figure 2 , bottom right panel). Cumulatively, about $141 billion of poison put bonds have been issued since 1991, with the median issuer issuing a face value of about $250 million. Data from the Flow of Funds at the Federal Reserve Board indicates that U.S. nonnancial corporations have cumulatively issued about $1,100 billion of bonds in the same period; therefore, poison puts have accounted for over 12 percent of all nonnancial issuance in the 1990s. As seen in the gure, most of the volume has been from speculative grade issuers.
Poison put bonds were initially designed to make rms less attractive as takeover targets (by increasing the immediate nancing needs of prospective acquirers) and thus provide an additional mechanism for strengthening managerial resistance to hostile bids. Their popularity increased rapidly in the late 1980's after leveraged buyouts lowered the credit quality of many rms and threatened the liquidity of corporate bond markets. In response to investors demand for protection against`event-risk', these puts gave holders rights to sell their bonds back to the issuer at par in the event o f a l e v eraged restructuring and subsequent downgrading. Initially, most puts were exercisable if there was the threat of a hostile takeover. Since most targets agreed to turn`friendly' just prior to the acquisition but still experienced a decline in their credit quality, it became common to make the bonds exercisable upon any c hange in ownership or recapitalization and a`large' downgrading of the debt by either Standard and Poor's or Moody's (see for example, Wrinkler 1988 , Weberman 1988 . Nash, Netter and Poulsen (1997) report characterisics of poison puts issued in 1989. Conditions (non-mutually exclusive) that could trigger the poison put included the following contigincies: the company merges with another company (about 67%), an individual becomes a benetial owner of more than a certain percent of stock (82%), a change in majority of the board of directors (42%) or a sale of all or substantially all assets (22%). In a third of the poison puts, the debt had to be downgraded in additon to one of the triggers mentioned. Crabbe (1991) estimated that the protection these bonds provided investors against`event risk' in the late 1980's reduced yields by about 30 basis points in the secondary market. The number of contigencies covered increased in subsequent contracts, often leading to extended legal battles before an eective exercise of the puts. In the 1990s, poison put bonds evolved (such as that of Kmart Corp.) that were exercisable just on a rating change alone, thus protecting the bondholders from declines in credit quality irrespective of the cause.
Pricing Non-Putable Bonds
We shall solve bond prices for a rm with protected debt outstanding. The basic structure of the model is as in Black and Cox (1976) , Longsta and Schwartz (1996) , and Briys and de Varenne (1997) . 2 In this section, the rm defaults only when the value of its assets hits an exogenously specied default boundary (discussed below). Later we will adjust the framework to price bonds when the company m a y be forced into a reorganization before its value hits the default boundary by the exercise of outstanding putable bonds.
Assumption 1 Following Vasicek (1977) , the dynamics of fr t g under the risk-neutral probability measure Q are d r t = ( r t ) dt + r dz 1t ;
(1) where , , and r are constants and fz 1t g is a Standard Brownian Motion process. Vasicek shows that the dynamics of return of the default-free zero coupon bond P(r t ; T ) maturing at time T are given at time t under Q by d P ( r ; t ; T ) P ( r ; t ; T ) = r t dt P (t; T) dz 1t ;
2 Several other papers with similar structures have been written. We do not attempt an exhaustive survey of the pricing literature. Notably, papers such as Brennan and Schwartz (1984) , Brennan, Detemple and Kalay (1989) , Leland (1994) , Leland and Toft (1996) and Merton (1974) have provided alternative conditions triggering default.
where P (t; T) is a deterministic function of time given by P (t; T) = r
( 1 exp( (T t) ) ) :
The value of the discount bond is given by P(r t ; T )=exp Assumption 3 The rm's asset process fV t g is independent of the capital structure of the rm. This is the standard assumption that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds. The assumption also implies that changes in capital structure, such a s p a yments of coupons and principal, have no eect on fV t g.
Assumption 4
There is senior and junior discount debt of B and D outstanding respectively; at the time of issuance, time 0, each dollar of debt promises a nal payment o f f S at maturity if the rm is solvent, where f S = e yS T , for S = B;D. The creditor owning these debts are protected upto fractions 0 S 1 of the promised payment at maturity through minimum net worth requirements: the creditors force the rm into ling for a reorganization when its value at time t hits the time-varying default boundary t . If the rm defaults at time t, the bondholders receive S f S P(r t ; t ; T ) in riskless securities that mature at T, t o a v alue of S f S . In addition, equity holders can extract a fraction E of the value of the rm net of any bankruptcy costs. We assume that bankruptcy costs are a fraction of the value of the rm. 
Due to the randomness of interest rates, the default boundary is stochastic. In this paper we do not make the important distinction between default and ling for a reorganization of liabilities. The protected fractions of the debts and the fraction of the value extracted by equity holders is determined by a bargaining process in bankruptcy, which is determined by a v ery complex set of rules (cf., for instance, Franks and Torous 1989) . The fractions may b e c hosen to be consistent with rules of absolute priority, although this is not essential. 3 If the rm les for bankruptcy prior to hitting the default boundary (its value is higher than that governed by minimum new worth), then all claims are paid in order of absolute priority. The values of dierent securities in bankruptcy is a very important topic for future research.
Assumption 5
A Leveraged Buyout (LBO) oer for the rm arrives with an exponential distribution with parameter .
The density of an LBO at time t is given by: f(tj) = exp( t ). 4 The LBO arrival process is statistically independent o f dz 1 and dz 2 . In the leveraged buyout, the junior debt of the rm is increased by a fraction > 1. This will cause an increase in the threshold default boundary to L t given by
By Assumption 3, the LBO will not aect the value of the rm's assets, therefore, the probability of a rm ling for bankruptcy will increase after the transaction. The LBO raises the debt-to-equity ratio of the rm. The LBO will be consummated only if the value of the rm's assets at the time of the LBO arrival exceeds L t , the post-LBO default boundary. The sudden possibility of a default gives the model some of the properties of the`reduced' form approach of bond pricing (c.f., for instance Madan and Unal 1994, Due and Singleton 1995) .
Assumption 6
We shall assume that if the value of the rms' assets at maturity is less than the face value of the debt, the rm will be able to raise additional debt, as long as its value exceeds the threshold default barrier. Under this assumption, the rm will not default on its debt at maturity as assumed in Briys and de Varenne (1997) . The assumption will also hold for any coupon payments made at discrete intervals. Therefore, we are also assuming there are no`ow' bankruptcy problems associated with coupon payments as in Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) .
Following the literature (cf., for instance, Longsta and Schwartz 1996 , Briys and de Varenne 1997 , Zhou 1997 ), we will use the Feynman-Kac Theorem (cf., for instance, Due 1992) to price the non-putable part of the bonds.
Dene the process fq t g = fln Vt t g, where f t g follows (6). Prior to an LBO, when q t hits zero, the rm defaults. After an LBO oer arrives, it will either be consummated or it will be passed up. In the former case, the rm defaults when q t hits ln(l), where l := B B + D D B B + D D . In the latter case, the default boundary does not change, and the rm will default when q t hits zero. The risk-neutral probability of default for a given asset value V t will be dierent for each of the three situations described; we will index the situation by K; K = P, for the case before the LBO arrival, K = L, after the completion of an LBO, and, K = U, if the LBO oer arrives but is not consummated. 
N() and n() are the c.d.f. and the density of a standard normal random variable, t1;t2 is computed in (8), and P(r t ; T ) , the price of a riskless discount bond, is as in (4).
Proof. (1), (2), (5) and (6) Now applying Ito's Lemma to the process fln Vt t g, implies the distribution as stated and the variance as in (8). Let q;0 be the rst time fq t g hits 0 | the asset value hits the default boundary. Now standard results on hitting times and the Time Change theorem (to convert probabilities with time t to time (t)) imply (9), (10), and (11) (for completely analogous results, see Briys and de Varenne 1997) . For further literature on hitting times see Harrison (1985) .
We next characterize prices of bonds after the arrival of the LBO oer. The prices naturally depend on whether or not the LBO was consummated. If the LBO is not consummated, then the default boundary is t and therefore, the probability of default is U (V t ; t ; t ; T ) = ( V t t ; t ; T ) where ( Vt t ; t ; T ) is provided in Lemma 1. Taking expectations, using U (V t ; t ; t ; T ) a s t h e probability o f default implies (12). Similarly, if the LBO is consummated, then the default boundary increases to L t , the process has the same law a s f q t g , implying that L (V t ; t ; t ; T ) = ( V t L t ; t ; T ). Again taking expectations implies (13).
We next characterize the probability of default when there is a potential LBO threat to the rm.
Lemma 3 Before the arrival of an LBO oer the price of a non-putable bond of seniority S, maturing at T, at time t, e quals P P S (V t ; r t ; t ; L t ; t ; T ) = f B P ( r t ; T ) [ 1 + P ( V t t ; L t ; t ; T )( S 1)];
where P (q t ; L t ; t ; T ) , the conditional probability of default by T under the risk-neutral measure Q, is written as the sum of the probabilities of four mutually exclusive events A; B; C; D whose conditional probabilities The proof is in the appendix. The probabilities above i n v olve i n tegrating the c.d.f. of the Normal distribution | for which there is no closed-form; nevertheless, the numerical integration is completely straightforward and can be performed in a negligible amount of time on a modern computer. We illustrate the Lemma with some sample paths that lead to defaults of Type A, B and C in Figure 3 . Lemmas 3 and 2 characterize the probability of default before and after an LBO. Ratings set by credit rating agencies, associate ratings with probabilities of default, therefore the probabilities calculated are sucient for the rating.
We n o w provide a characterization of the costs of bankruptcy upto period T: since bankruptcy costs are a xed proportion of the value of the rm at bankruptcy, and the rm defaults when its value hits t before an LBO or L t after the LBO, the expected costs of bankruptcy up to period T, can be evaluated by the same formulas above for pricing bonds. Proof. The default boundaries before and after the LBO oer arrival as given in (6) and (7) respectively. Before the LBO oer arrival, the transition density function for the fq t g f Vt t g process is P (q t ; L t ; t ; T ).
The costs are higher for defaults of Type C (see Lemma 3). Taking expectations implies (19). Since there is only one LBO oer possible, after an oer arrival, the transition density function is (q t ; t ; T ). Again, taking expectations yields (20) if the LBO was was successful, and (21) if was unsuccessful.
4 The Put Induced Crisis
The rm is assumed to be in an immediate nancial crisis in Period P : it has D of junior putable bonds outstanding that will be exercised if the company's debt rating falls below a pre-specied threshold level and has eectively liquid assets smaller than the amount of debt to be paid back to the putable bondholders. 5
The rm also has B of senior non-putable debt (this might be all bank debt) and D N of junior non-putable debt. It is assumed that the rm's current rating (bond price) is close at the threshold rating (exercise price). The equity holders of the rm are assumed to be represented collectively by the management and shall be referred to as the`rm'. The rm enters into a bargaining process with the putable bondholders in an attempt to buy back the put options and hence delay p a ying back the debt. It is assumed that all the putable bondholders are fully cognizant of the balance sheet of the company | and therefore there is a complete information bargaining problem. If the rm fails to negotiate a settlement to buy out the put options on the debt, and the bondholders put their bonds, then it must le for a reorganization of its liabilities.
The putable bonds are exercisable at par when its credit rating hits a prespecied level; it can be alternatively assumed that the bonds become exercisable when the bond price or some other observed variable that captures a salient aspect of the rm's credit quality hits some prespecied level. In recent years several putable bonds have been issued that are exercisable when the rm is purchased by a buyer through a leveraged buyout transaction. Moody's associate probabilities of default with each rating. In this model, by Lemmas 2 and 3, the probability of default is a continuous function of the value of its assets, and therefore, puts are exercisable when the value hits v P , v L or v U under situations P;Lor U respectively. In this and all sections upto Section se:prior we shall assume that the value of the rm's assets has just hit on one these exercise boundaries, and therefore the puts are immediately exercisable. The pricing of the debt is as described in Section 3. The senior bondholders have written covenants on the activities of the rm. The covenant is summarized in the next assumption.
Assumption 7
If the rm accelerates the payments on more than a T of outstanding putable bonds (a trigger amount), then it is forced into ling for a reorganization of all its liabilities. If the rm les before its asset value hits the default boundary boundary as dened in (6) (or (7) after a successful LBO), then the recoveries of the various claim holders are made in order of absolute priority. The sequence of events in laid out in Figure  4 . Consistent with the assumptions on payouts in bankruptcy, it is assumed that payments at the time the bonds are put, P , are made in riskless securities that mature at T: B P F (V P ; r P ; T )=minf (1 ) V P ; B f B P ( r P ; T ) g ; (22) D N P ;F (V P ; r P ;
E P F (V P ; r P ; T )=V P B P F D P F ; (25) for senior debt B, junior non-putable debt D N , junior putable debt D and equity E.
If the company is able to negotiate a settlement to buy back enough of the options, it needs immediate nancing of W, which comprises of X C to pay for the options, and D P to pay for the putable debt that is put (an agreement with some of the bondholders might be sucient t o s t a v e o an immediate reorganization). The rms eective liquidity constrains it to letting D P T , the trigger level. At the maturity of the debt T, the rm will either be`insolvent' with probability K due to poor performance, or it is`solvent' with probability 1 K , when the situation is K = P; L; U as described in Section 3, and the probabilities, K , are as in Lemmas 2 and 3. The payos of the dierent liabilities in insolvency is as described in Section 3. A o w c hart describing the crisis is displayed in Figure 4 .
The immediate nancing need of L can be achieved through one of two methods: 1) The rm can issue equity; 2) A new bail-out loan. It is assumed that the bail-out loan is unprotected ( L = 0), and therefore its issuance does not change the default boundary of the rm. It is evident that if the new loan is priced at par (P L = 1), and there are no distress costs of issuing equity, the rm shall be indierent b e t w een raising debt and equity; even though quite standard, this is formally shown below.
Lemma 5 If the bail-out loan is made at par (P K L = 1 ), for K = P; L; U, and equity can be issued at no distress-costs, then equity holders are indierent to the method of nancing.
Proof. Let Intuitively, because the bail-out loan is senior to equity, the residual claim of the current equity holders will be the same for each of the two methods. Since it is unlikely that the distress costs of equity a t the time of a nancial crisis are non-zero, we shall assume that the nancing need is met through a bail-out loan. The payos at maturity for the dierent classes of creditors are as described in Section 3; each creditor receives f S = e yS T at maturity if there is no default, and S f S if default occurs prior to T (Assumptions 3 and 5).
Condition 1 14
The putable bonds holders make full recovery of face value and accrued interest if the rm les for a reorganization of its liabilities at a value of assets higher than the threshold value: D P ;F (V P ; r P ; T ) D f D P ( r P ; T ) ; where D P ;F is dened in (24); the condition is equivalent to (1 ) V P B f B P ( r P ; T ) + ( D N + D ) f D P ( r P ; T ).
Condition 1 is needed for the existence of a solution to the bargaining problem between the putable bondholders and the rm (to be discussed below). It will be shown that if the condition holds, then the value of pure bondholder coalitions is monotonically increasing in the size of the coalition. Conversely, it will be shown by an example that if the condition is violated, then the proposed non-cooperative solution will not belong to the core of the bargaining game (to be dened). If the condition is violated, then there will a breakdown of negotiations between the putable bondholders and equityholders leading to an exercise of the options and an immediate reorganization of the liabilities of the rm. It will also be seen that the assumption is suciently strong to imply that collectively the putable bondholders and the rm have a larger`pie' to share between them by negotiating a settlement than in an immediate reorganization when the rating of the rm hits speculative grade.
Let us dene the function v K P (S) to be the value of the claims of a coalition of players S I, when all players make coalitionally optimal decisions, where I is the set of all players in the game, the situation of the game is K for K = P; L; U, and P denotes the time at which the bonds become putable. We assume that the equity holders are collectively represented by the management, also called the`rm'. We abuse notation slightly to let v K P (D S ) to be the market value of a set S of putable bondholders, and v K
the market value of the equity holders and a set S of putable bondholders. Let C be the set of bondholders that decide to sell their options back to the company and P be the set of bondholders that decide to put their bonds, at the time when the options rst become exercisable. If the bondholders do not put their bonds, then the value of their claims is P K D per dollar of debt. Therefore, each bondholder not cooperating with the rm has a dominant strategy of putting his bonds when
Under Condition 1, they receive f B P(r P ; T ) per dollar of debt in each situation, which is larger than P K D as long as the probability of default is positive (see Lemmas 2 and 3); therefore,
Dene the functions v K (V P ; P ; L P ; r P ; p ; T )= V P B K P ( V P ; P ; L P ; r P ; p ; T ) B P K B ( V P ; P ; L P ; r P ; p ; T ) D N P K D (V P ; P ; L P ; r P ; p ; T ) ; (28) for K = P; L; U where the bankruptcy cost functions are given in (19), (20), and (21) respectively, and the pricing functions are in (14), (13), and (12). The function v K is the size of the`pie' to be shared between the equity holders and the putable bondholders in the situation K. The total value to divide between the rm and the putable bondholders is given by the value of the assets less the expected costs of bankruptcy upto period T and the payments to senior and other junior putable debtholders.
To simplify the notation, from now o n w e shall omit the arguments of the functions v, P K , E P F , D P F and B K . For example, we shall write v K (V P ; P ; L P ; r P ; p ; T ) simply as v K P . The market value of the claims of equity holders and the set of cooperating bondholders is given by
L = D P + X C , is the size of the bail-out loan needed by the rm immediately, and X C (a function of the same arguments V P ; P ; L P ; r P ; p , and T) is the payment for the options. When (D D C ) > T , non-cooperating bondholders put their bonds and force the rm is forced into ling for an immediate reorganization. D P F and E P F are given in (24) and (25).
Lemma 6 If Condition 1 holds, the rm is solvent and is in situation K for K = P; L; U, then
Therefore, the value of resources to be shared b y e quity holders and putable bondholders if they successfully negotiate a settlement is larger than if the rm fails immediately.
The proof is in the appendix.
Intrinsic and Strategic Values of the Options
The solution concept to solve the bargaining problem between the rm and putable bondholders uses recent results on N-player sequential, perfect information, non-cooperative games by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) . The game is played following a multilateral meeting with the requirement of unanimity for agreement. Let v(S) be a function that assigns to every subset I of the set of players, of the game the total utility that coalition can attain if all its members agree. 6 The N-person noncooperative game is dened as follows:
In each round there is a set S I of \active" players, and a \proposer" i 2 S. In the rst round S = I. The proposer is chosen at random out of S, with all players in S being equally likely to be selected. The proposer makes a \proposal" which is feasible, i.e. a p a y o vector in v(S). If all the members of S accept it | they are asked in some pre specied order | then the game ends with these payos. If it is rejected by e v en one member of S, then we m o v e t o t h e next round where, with probability , the set of active players is again S and, with probability 1 , the proposer \drops out" and the set of active players becomes S f i g . In the latter case the dropped out proposer i gets a nal payo of 0. (Hart and Mas-Colell 1996) .
The key modelling aspect is the specication of what happens if there is no agreement and, as a consequence, the game moves to a new stage. In the framework, the breakdown of negotiations is not an \all or nothing" matter. When a player leaves the game, the rest continue bargaining | albeit over a diminished \pie". The cost of delay in agreement is present in the form of the breakdown probability 1 .
Result 1 If all players are risk-neutral, Condition 1 holds, the value function is dened in (26), (27), (29), and (30) gives the value of coalitions when the rm and bondholders bargain over the value of the put options on the bonds in situation K, for K = P; L; U, and players follow the sequence of moves as described a b ove, then the proposals made in the unique Stationary Subgame Perfect equilibrium of the game with transferable utility are a c c epted; the equilibrium payo vector converges to the Shapley Value of the game (a cooperative game theory axiomatic solution) as ! 1. The Shapley Value of player i is: The proof is in the appendix. The Shapley value is the average marginal value of a player, where the average results by imagining the random formation of a coalition of all the players, starting with a single member and adding one player at a time. Each player is then assigned his marginal contribution accruing to the coalition at the time of his admission. In this process of computing the expected value for an individual player all coalition formations are considered as equally likely. In Result 1, the random assignment of the rst player, and the small probability of each player dropping out leads to the possibility o f e a c h coalition forming with equal probability.
We are interested in studying the relationship between the intrinsic and strategic values of options.
Let the bonds become exercisable at time P , then the intrinsic value of the put options in situation K for K = P; L; U equals
Under Condition 1, upon exercise, the put holder receives full recovery of principal plus accrued interest of f B P(r P ; T ); the second equality follows from Lemmas (2) and (3). Since we h a v e assumed that the nonputable debt of the rm trades freely in perfectly competitive markets at all times, we dene the strategic value of the put options on the putable debt as the excess of the value of the player over the value of the nonputable debt. Therefore, at the time the options become exercisable, when the situation is K, and the set of players is I the strategic value of the options of player i equals S V D i ;K P I = maxf
Lemma 7 Under Condition 1, Di;K P D i f B P(r P ; T ) . Therefore, the strategic value of the put option of a bondholder owning putable debt D i equals:
where, K (; ) is the probability of default in situation K as given in Lemmas 2 and 3.
The proof is in the appendix. The theory of bargaining has progressed rapidly in the past several years. The recent focus has been on non-cooperative approaches, completely dened by a particular sequence of moves (oers and replies) to be made over time in the course of negotiations, and then looking for noncooperative equilibrium in the game thus specied. One of the biggest breakthroughs for the 2-person bargaining game was made by Rubinstein (1982) who solved for a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the`alternating oers' model with an explicit cost of delay | modeled as a`shrinking of the pie'. For more than two players, the Rubinstein model yields a folk-like theorem (a continuum of equilibria), if the solution concept is merely subgame perfection. Some examples of this and a survey of bargaining models are available in Sutton (1986) . To push the analysis forward, theorists have concentrated on stationary subgame perfect equilibria | where strategies are such that the choice at each stage only depends on the current state of the game. For transferable utility games, the convergence of stationary equilibrium in the N-player bargaining problem to the Shapley Value have been found (in addition to the model of Hart and Mas-Colell) with dierent sets of rules by Harsanyi (1981) and Winter (1994) . The Hart and Mas-Colell model is particularly appealing when players all meet together to negotiate (some others model multiple bilateral negotiations), and partial breakdown (by some players is allowable). Since the same solution obtains under a variety o f rules, we nd it comfortable to posit the Shapley Value as the solution.
Equally Sized Bondholders
In the case where there are N bondholders each holding D N of the face value of putable debt, the notation is further simplied by dening v K P (E [ D n ), the total expected amount that can be distributed between the 18 equity holders and n cooperating bondholders. Using (29) Using (26) and (27) for pure bondholder coalitions,
= n N D P F ; when n N > T D: (38) There are N + 1 players in the game, with N bondholders. Then from (31), the Shapley Value of the rm for this special case is The proportion M c N+1 represents the proportion of all coalitions (including the rm) in which the rm reaches a settlement and avoids bankruptcy. 7 When there are N equally-sized bondholders it is a sucient statistic for the bargaining strength of the rm relative to the putable bondholders. Since the fraction is non-monotonic in the number of putable bondholders, it leads to a non-monotonicity in the bargaining strength of the rm. We illustrate the phenomenon with an example. which is illustrated in Figure 5 .
Example 1
The following parameters describe the problem at the time the bonds rst become putable: v = 3, D = :5, f D = 2:5, P(r P ; T ) = : 4, D P F = :5, T = :1, E P F = 2, and T = :25. Using Lemma 2 we calculate the strategic value of the rm, the strategic value of each bondholder and the payment for the option as dened in (33) for N = 1; ; 20. The three values along with the ratio M c N+1 are displayed in the three panels of Figure 5 . As seen in the gure, the strategic values of the rm and the bondholders vary positively and negatively respectively with the ratio. Of note is the fact that the strategic value of the option can be signifantly larger than one. For example when N = 5, the strategic value of the rm equals 1:83, and that of the bondholders equal 1:17. Therefore each bondholder has a strategic value of :23. Since each bondholder owns :1 of putable debt, the value of the option by (33) equals 2:08. The ratio M c N+1 tends to T D = :2 a s N ! 1 , t h us providing a limiting value for the value of the rm.
Corollary 1 The limit of the equity holders value as the number of putable bondholders becomes large is:
Interpretation of Limiting Value: The form of the limiting bargaining value of the equity holders suggests that T D can be interpreted as a probability. 8 With innitesimal bondholders there is a probability 1 T D , o f a coalition forming that will force the company i n to a reorganization. With the complementary probability T D , the company will purchase the options back from enough bondholders to avert a reorganization of the rm. Put slightly dierently, the Shapley Value of a player is the average marginal contribution of the player across all possible coalitions. When each bondholder contributes an innitesimal, the average and marginal contributions coincide, and the Shapley Value of each bondholder is simply his average contribution. See Ostroy (1984) for an elucidation of this point. 7 bN T c , using the oor function, is the largest integer less than or equal to N T . Note that bN T c + 1 is not always equal to = dN T e (using the analogous ceiling function). For example when T =D = 2 = 3 and N equals 3, the former number equals 3 and the latter 2. However, D 2=3 = T , therefore the smallest threatening coalition must have three bondholders.
It is well known that as the numb e r o f p l a y ers increases to innity, the Shapley Value converges to the Walrasian equilibrium of the game. The limiting value obtained above is useful because it enables the pricing of covenants of debt in a perfectly competitive setting. It is seen that even with innitesimal putable bondholders in a decentralized setting, such bondholders have joint threatening power.
Corollary 2 Proof. Using Result 2, and the denitions of intrinsic and strategic values as in (32) and (33),
The intrinsic value of the options is I V K In the other, the rm fails to purchase the options from the bondholder and therefore the rm contributes a marginal value equal to E P F . Note that the same value results for a large range in values of T ; irrespective of T , whenever the bondholder puts the company is forced into a reorganization. Generalizing, whenever N is small enough so that D N > T , the same strategic values result for a trigger value satisfying 0 < D N < T .
Special Case 2: For T D, E N = v D f D P ( r P ; T ), 8N. Therefore, when there is no trigger level (all the puts can be exercised without forcing the company i n to a reorganization), the strategic value of the rm does not depend on the number of bondholders that own its debt. Without a liquidity problem, the bondholders have no threatening power and therefore the value of the rm does not depend on the number of bondholders. The strategic value of the bondholders equals the face value of the debt, and hence the strategic value of the put option, as dened in (34), equals the intrinsic value of the options.
Special Case 3: lim T ! 0 E N = E P F N N +1 + ( v D f D P ( r P ; T ) ) 1 N +1 . In this case, each bondholder can unilaterally bankrupt the rm. Therefore, the rm obtains the same as any bondholder 1 N+1 of the expected total resources in non-bankrupt states. When N become large, the rms strategic value declines to E P F , its residual value in an immediate reorganization.
Most theorists (for example, Aivazian and Callen 1983) have argued that a reasonable solution to a bargaining game between players prior to bankruptcy must be in the core of the game. We will shown with an example that the Shapley Value of the game described is not in the core if Condition 1 is violated.
The core of a game in coalitional form with characteristic function v and the set of players I is dened as the set of allocations:
The core is the set of allocations that is coalitionally rational, i.e., no coalition of members can break away, and using only the resources of the coalition, provide each member a larger amount than the core allocation. 7 The Bargaining Strength of a Large Bondholder
Large institutional lenders are fairly common in most borrowing arrangements. For example, the private placement of debt is often done through a lead lender. The lender takes on a large amount of the loan and often performs various tasks in servicing the loan for other lenders. We abstract from this monitoring function of the largest lender and focus our attention to the threatening power of the large lender relative t o other lenders. Conditions under which the strategic value of the large lender is greater are provided below. The value of each of the smaller bondholders equals:
The summations in the two equations lead to long polynomials that can be easily written down using a symbolic mathematical program such as Mathematica. We have preferred to leave them in the current form because the solutions are more transparent for the reader under this form. 23 7.1 One Large and One Small Bondholder Does a putable bondholder owning large amounts of putable bonds necessarily have a higher strategic value per dollar of putable debt owned? Does a rm with one large and one small bondholder necessarily have a higher strategic value than another with the same amount of total putable debt split equally between two bondholders? We demonstrate in this section that the answer to both questions is`No'. Conditions under which the statements holds true are provided.
Example 3
Suppose there is one large and one small bondholder holding D 1 and D of putable debt respectively. The following parameters describe the problem: v P = 5, D = :3, D 1 = :6, f D = 2:5, P(r P ; T ) = : 4, T = :1, E P F = 3, and T = :25. Using Lemma 8, Figure 6 shows the strategic values for the large and small bondholders per dollar of debt and the strategic value of the rm when the trigger level of debt is allowed to vary between 0 and D + D 1 . The values remain constant within three regions to be dened below but exhibit some important discontinuities as the trigger level moves from one region to the next. The three cases determine the relative bargaining strengths of the large and small bondholders and the rm. As is Lemma 2, the values of the players depend on the proportion of coalitions that can credibly threaten the company i n to a reorganization. The three distinct cases are: Cases (i) and (iii) are similar in that the small and the large bondholder can potentially be part of an identical number of coalitions that can lead to a reorganization of the rm. In Case (ii), the large bondholder can be involved in a larger number of successful coalitions; the coalition E S D 1 (the rm and large bondholder) does not have to le for reorganization but the coalition E S D (the rm and large bondholder) is forced into it. Not surprisingly, Figure 6 shows that the strategic value per dollar of the large bondholder is substantially larger than that for the small bondholder. In Cases (i) and (iii) the strategic value per dollar of the small bondholders debt is larger. The reasoning is as follows; in coalitions in which the company les for reorganization, each dollar of debt | either of the large or the small bondholder | has the same recovery, 1 D + D 1 D P F . In coalitions in which reorganization is avoided, each dollar of the large bondholders debt contributes v P D 1 of the total value and while each dollar of the small bondholder's debt contributes a larger v P D of the total value. Said simply, the cooperation of each lender is required for the players to jointly realize the`pie' v P ; therefore the smaller bondholder contributes more per dollar. Therefore, if the large and the small bondholders are involved in the same number of non-bankrupt coalitions, then the small bondholder has a higher strategic value per dollar. Figure 6 that < T . The rst two terms in each situation are the same since the total amount of putable debt is constant. In the rst case, the value is smaller than the situation where there is one large bondholder and in the second, the value is larger.
It is evident from

One Large and Several Small Bondholders
When D < D 1 , the analysis closely follows that of the case when there is one large and one small bondholder. For example, when D < T D 1 , then the strategic value of the rm and the large players do not depend on N, the number of small bondholders, because these players are never pivotal to any threatening coalition. When D < D 1 , the analysis can be divided into cases similar to those in the previous subsection.
Example 4
Suppose there is one large and one small bondholder holding D 1 and D of putable debt respectively. The following parameters describe the problem:
v P = 5, D = :6, D 1 = :3, f D = 2:5, P(r P ; T ) = : 4, T = :1, E P F = 3, and T = :4. Using Lemma 8, Figure 6 shows the strategic values for the large and small bondholders per dollar of debt and the strategic value of the rm when the trigger level of debt is allowed to vary between 0 and D + D 1 . Figure 7 shows the relative bargaining powers of the players forthree dierent cases. Just as in Lemma 2, the values of the players depend on the proportion of coalitions that can credibly threaten the company into a reorganization. In Case (i), T < D 1 < D, therefore, a collection of atleast M 0 bondholders (dened above), the large bondholder alone or the large bondholder and M 1 bondholders can credibly threaten the rm. As the debt D is divided among a large number of bondholders, a larger number of threatening coalitions can be formed. Therefore, as N increases, the value of the large relative to small bondholders tends to decrease (the non-monotonicity as discussed previously applies). In Case (ii), D 1 < T < D and (iii), D 1 < D < T, the large bondholder cannot trigger a bankruptcy on his own. Cooperation with some amount of putable debt is needed. As N increases, the potential threatening coalitions he is a part of increase, therefore increasing his relative v alue with the number of small bondholders.
8 Bargaining Problem at the time of Kmart's Poison Put Crisis
All but one parameter of the model needed to calculate strategic values using Lemma 2 have either been obtained from publicly released data or from previous empirical studies. The only free parameter, | the arrival probability o f a n L B O | i s b a c k ed out from observed bond prices and the use of Lemma 3. It has been reported that the total settlement to buy out the put options was about $98 million for options on face value of $550 million. News reports also suggested that one large insurance company | holding almost a fth of the putable debt | had been paid 5 times per dollar as smaller bondholders for surrendering their options. 9 Reports of unequal payments to dierent bondholders lead us to believe that the parties concerned were considering the relative threatening powers of the dierent bondholders in their evaluation of the settlement. The calibration exercise is as follows: is as follows: The average maturity of debt outstanding was about 12 years. Most of the bonds carried a coupon of 7-11 %. As seen in the top right panel of Figure 2 , the spread on Kmart debt increased to about 500 basis points. Market data reveals that Kmart's 8 1 2 bonds traded at about 89 cents to the dollar. Using (4), and the parameters above for the Vasicek process at a short-term rate of 5.8 % (the Federal Funds rate at the time of the crisis) imply that a 12-year discount bond would be valued at P(:058; 12) = :418 cents per dollar. Typically, the recovery on junior debt in bankruptcy is D = :33 (Moody's (1997) Values in an Immediate Reorganization: 12 We assume that the level of debts on the books of the company shown above equal principal and accrued interest. Therefore, (7) ) L = 42:83 (Default Boundary Prior After LBO as in (6) ) Since P(:055; 12) equals :418, t = 7 : 32 and L t = 1 7 : 9. To match the default probability o f 12 = :38, with the market values of junior and the above default boundaries, the implied value of the LBO arrival parameter is = :02. However, because the current market value of the assets is very low, with a high probability the value of the assets at the time of the LBO oer arrival will be below L t , the higher default boundary in the event the LBO is consummated. The model implies that the probability o f a T ype-C default (see Figure 3 ) is only about .04%. Using (19) these boundaries imply that the expected discounted bankruptcy costs equal B P P(0; 12) = $:1b: Finally, using (28), v, the`pie' to be shared between the putable bondholders and the rm is $3.71b.
Using Lemma 8 with the above parameter values, it is estimated that the strategic value per dollar of option at the time of bargaining was about $.48 per dollar for the large bondholder, and about $.43 per dollar for the small bondholders, for an aggregate payment o f about $241 million. Some reports have suggested that Kmart made a total payment of about $98 million for the removal of the options. Also, the model suggests that the strategic value for the large bondholder was larger than that of the smaller bondholders, but the dierence is not as large as rumored in the media (opening paragraph of this section). 13 The model also suggests that if there was a single bondholder owning all the debt, the payout for the rm would have been $70 million lower! Similarly, h a v e a trigger of about $220 million instead of $110 million, would have s a v ed the rm almost $60 million at the time of settlement.
Readers might suppose that the strategic values calculated are implausibly high. One reason that the strategic value per dollar calculated is enormous, is because the exercise of more than $110 million of putable bonds can reduce the claims of equity holders by about $800m. As another conceptual experiment, suppose all the rms junior debt was putable. Keeping the same proportional trigger amount of 20 percent o f the face value of the putable debt, or $1 billion, we recalculate that the strategic value of the large bondholder is about 16.8c per dollar of putable debt, and that of the small bondholder is about 16c per dollar.
Pricing Options Prior to Crisis
In this section we shall price two dierent kinds of Poison Put Bonds at the time of issuance of these bonds. We shall call the bonds`Ordinary' Poison Puts, when holders can put their bonds back to the issuer at par in the event o f a l e v eraged restructuring and subsequent d o wngrading to speculative grade (any specic rating category). 14 We shall call the bonds`Super' Poison Puts, when the holders can put the bonds if the credit rating of the bonds hits speculative grade, irrespective of the reason for the downgrade (see the comments in Section about the evolution of such bonds). We shall assume that the rating of the bonds are solely determined by their probabilities of default. Because the value of the rm's assets follows a continuous process, for every time-horizon there exists a lower bound for the value of the rm's assets hits in situation K, the rating turns from investment to speculative grade. It is evident that for a given probability of default at any horizon V L;t V P;t V U;t because the default boundary is lowest for the case K = U, and highest for K = L; for the case K = P, the higher default boundary obtains when an LBO is successfully consummated, and since this is in independent e v ent with probability less than one, V P , lies between the other two.
Assumption 8 The speculative grade boundary in situation K, for K = P; L; U, is given by V K;t = V K P(r t ; T ) , where v K is a constant that will be substituted into (9) to match the default scale S (T ) by Moody's Investor Service, as shown in Table 1 . Corresponding to the normalization of asset value in Section 3, we dene v K;t = v K P(r t ; T ) = ln
The super poison puts are exercisable (a) Prior to the LBO the asset value drifts down to the default boundary, (b) At the time of the LBO, the rm's credit rating (default probability) jumps down due to a rise in the default boundary (c) After a successful LBO, the rm's rating is above speculative grade, but subsequently the asset value drift down to the higher default boundary, and (d) After an unsuccessful LBO attempt, the rm's rating is above speculative grade, but subsequently the asset value drift down. Let S (T ) be an exogenously given function that gives the probability of default for a bond of maturity T, a t which the rating turns from investment to speculative grade.
Prior to an LBO, the rm's rating turns speculative grade when its normalized value q t hits v K .
The option pays o at the rst time the value hits a payo boundary. Since the rating boundary increases at the riskless rate (same as the default boundary), analogous logic to that used in Lemma 1 and the spatial homogeneity of Brownian Motion implies that conditional on q 0 , the density of the time to hit speculative grade is r 0 (m 0 ; 0; t ) = 0 ( m 0 v P ; 0 ; t ) ;
where 0 (m 0 ; 0; t ) is given by (10). Similarly, the transition density on the normalized space, conditional on the rm's value always remaining above the speculative grade boundary is p r (m 0 ; y ; 0 ; t ) = p a ( m 0 v P ; y v ; 0 ; t )
where p a (q 0 ; y ; t ) is given by (11).
Result 3 (Super Poison Puts) Let P 0 (f) be the value at the time 0 of issuance of a situation-dependent security, f, that pays the value f K (V P ), at the time of exercise of the super poison put options P , if the situation is K, and the exercise boundaries are dened in Assumption 8. Then, its value is the sum of four parts. Each part constitutes the value of the option in one of four mutually exclusive events E;F;F;H. Where l was dened i n L emma 3, r 0 (q 0 ; 0; t ) is dened in (46) and p r (q 0 ; y:s; t) is dened in (47).
The proof is in the appendix. Again for exposition we display the payos under the four events in Figure 8 .
Corollary 4 Suppose Condition 1 holds at each boundary V K P , for K = P; L; U. Let P 0 (1) be the value of a s e curity that pays P(r P ;T ) at P . P 0 ( v K P ) = P 0 (v) P 0 (B) B P 0 ( P B )
P 0 (P B ) = P 0 (1) f B + f B P 0 ((; )) ( B 1) ]; (20), (21), P B (; ) takes the values P K B (; ) as provided i n L emmas 2 and 3, P 0 () is the operator dened in Lemma 3, and E 0 (; ) denotes the expectation at time 0 under the risk-neutral measure Q.
Proof. The value of the rm at P equals V K;P . By Assumption 8, this equals v K P(r P ; T ), which has a time T value of v K . Therefore P 0 (V P ) = P 0 ( v ), where P 0 () is the operator dened in Lemma 3. Now using the denition of v K P in (28) implies (52). The proof for the other variables results from a similar application of the P 0 () operator.
Corollary 4 can be used to nd formulas for the intrinsic and strategic values of the put options at the time of issuance. The strategic value of the options depends on the ownership structure of the options at the time of the put; to price the strategic value at the time of the crisis, we shall assume that all agents believe that the ownership structure of the options will not change upto the maturity of the debt. Given the ownership structure, the strategic value of each player at the time of bargaining will provide the boundary conditions for the value of the option, when the asset value hits the triggering boundary V K;t in situation K at time t.
Assumption 9 Allagents believe that the ownership structure of the options will not change upto the maturity of the debt.
For example, for the case of N equally sized putable bondholders, using (32) and (44) P 0 (I V ) = f D (1 D ) P 0 ( K (; )); and (56)
In the case when there is one large holder holding D 1 of putable debt, and N equally sized holders owning D of the debt, the equations in Lemma 8 determine the boundary conditions for the value of the rm and the bondholders. Then Corollary 4 determines the value of the relevant v ariables at the time of issuance, as illustrated in 57. When Condition 1 is not satised, then Corollary 4 cannot be used directly. In that situation, the payos in an bankruptcy will have to substituted at the boundaries where the condition fails.
Result 4 (Ordinary Poison Puts) Let P o 0 (f) be the value at the time 0 of issuance of a situation-dependent security, f, that pays the value f L (V P ) P(r P ;T ), at the time of exercise of the ordinary poison put options P , if the situation is L, and the exercise boundaries are dened in Assumption 8. Then 
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Proof. The rm's rating turns from investment to speculative grade at the time of LBO if its normalized value lies in (l;v L ). Using the density function of the LBO arrival and integrating implies (58).
We note that the formula for valuing the ordinary poison put closely resembles the formula for P 0 (G) of the super poison put in Lemma 3. The only dierence is that the super poison put pays o at the rst time the rating hits speculative grade, while the ordinary put does not. Ofcourse, the option does not pay o if the rm defualts prior to the LBO arrival. Therefore, we use the transition density function p a (q 0 ; y ; 0 ; t ) for the ordinary put valuation and the p r (q 0 ; y ; 0 ; t ) transition density for the super poison put valuation. Again, the speculative grade rating boundary in the formulation can be substituted by a n y specic rating category.
Example 5 Recall that the rm's rating are lowered into the speculative grade range in situation S at time t if the value of its assets falls to v S P(r t ; T ). The cumulative probabilities of default over horizons of 1,2,5,10, and 20 years are :010; : 037; : 12; : 22; : 37 when the value of the assets hits V P;t prior to an LBO arrival. After an LBO arrival, the implied default rates are :007; : 035; : 11; : 23; : 38 respectively for the ve time horizons. Moody's usually rates rms with a 20-year cumulative default rate of :38 or more speculative grade (Table   1) . 15 Strategic and intrinsic values are shown in Table 2 . The table shows that the strategic and intrinsic values are each decreasing in the value of the rm. This is because the probability o f a p a y out increases as the value of the rm is lowered towards it downgrade boundary. Using Lemma 3 we estimate the 20-year default probabilities for each of the asset values displayed. The probabilities are usually associated with Moody's rating as shown in the third column. The intrinsic values of the ordinary Poison Puts are extremely small, between :001 and :006 for rms with ratings comparable Aaa to Baa2. The strategic values range between :02 and :19 for these rating categories. The strategic values of the Super Poison puts are about 12-17 times larger than their intrinsic values. Also notably, the strategic values of the options can be larger than 1, for rms with ratings close to the speculative grade boundary. In these cases the value of the options will increase the face value of the debt.
Example 6 (Correlation Between Asset Value and Short-Term Rates and the Value of Options).
The same set of parameters are used for the last example. However, the asset value for all cases considered is 45. The correlation coecient is varied between :3 and :3. For each case, the rating boundaries for the normalized asset process v K , for K = P; L; U are recalculated for each example and are shown in columns 3-5 of Table 3 . These levels are calculated using Lemma 3 to match the 20-year default probability of Moody's Ba rated bonds. It can be checked that Condition 1 is satised at each o f the boundaries for each case considered. The rating boundaries are increasing in the correlation coecient, since the asset process is eectively more`volatile'. Therefore the probability of default is hit when the rm has a higher asset value. Because of the higher asset values at the times the options become exercisable, the intrinsic and strategic values of the options are greater.
Conclusion and Extensions
Putable bonds give the bondholders threatening power to force the company i n to a reorganization in times of low liquidity. We h a v e used recent results in bargaining theory to provide strategic values of putable bonds. It is shown that these bondholders can extract more than their intrinsic values from the company. The strategic values of these bondholders depend crucially on the eective liquidity-to-putable debt ratio of the rm. Even when the number of bondholders increases to innity (a reasonable approximation for publicly issued bonds), the two v alues will not coincide for an eective liquidity-to-putable debt ratio less than one. A calibration exercise suggests that a large bondholder had a signicantly higher strategic value in a poison put induced crisis aecting Kmart Corp. last year. While previous research has shown that including a put provision into bonds can reduce the yields for issuers, there seems to be a possibility of a large cost of including such c o v enants. In Kmart's case, the crisis would have been avoided (the bondholders would have negligible threatening power) if the company had not entered into some very restrictive c o v enants on the use of cash with their banks. While it is very clear why the banks wanted such a c o v enant | they did not want an eective violation of their seniority and hence be left as the last claimants in case of a large deterioration in the rm's credit quality | our model suggests that the company could have s a v ed itself of a costly payout by either (a) issuing all the putable debt to one borrower, or (b) having a looser covenant on option buyback. Prior to the crisis, the model suggested is general enough to price dierent v ariations on the poison puts. In light of the vast heterogeneity in the contingencies that might trigger the put (Section 2), a careful analysis of the contract is essential for a useful pricing exercise.
The paper has focused on the negotiation that arises between a borrower and lenders as a result of the borrower's violation of a particular covenant | the value of its assets hitting a pre-specied lower bound. The negotiations are successful if the combined value of the parties is higher in continuation than in an immediate costly reorganization. The bargaining solution exhibits dierential strategic value for large and small lenders and non-vanishing strategic values for lenders even for innitesimal lenders. One important extension of this analysis is to analyze the recontracting possibilities that arise upon the violation of other covenants that are set in bond contracts to mitigate the conicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders (see for example, Smith and Warner 1979). The can also be extended to the bank loan and private placement markets, in which it is also typical for lenders to impose covenants on the rm's debt and for the prevalance of large players of dierent sizes (see for example, Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell 1993) . A strategic value approach might partly explain why the nature of covenants varies across the three types of loans. Because the solution proposed holds only under symmetric information between the parties involved, its usefulness would be limited to the analysis when the contracts being analyzed have this property.
Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3.
First, suppose that the LBO oer arrives at some time s 2 [0; T ] (the probability of this is f(sj) = exp( s )). Then, there are three mutually exclusive possibilities (purely for exposition, these are illustrated in Figure 3 ). We shall use the Chapman-Kolmogorov property of Markov processes, and the independence of the LBO arrival process from interest rate and asset value shocks, to compute the probability of default of the rm before maturity. Let P (q t ; L t ; t ; T ) be the risk-neutral probability of default; it can be written as P (q t ; L t ; t ; T ) = A ( q t ; L t ; t ; T ) + B ( q t ; L t ; t ; T ) + C ( q t ; L t ; t ; T ) + D ( q t ; L t ; t ; T ) where A; B; C; D are mutually exclusive e v ents to be described below. A Type A default occurs when the asset process hits the default barrier before s. Paths of Type B have s V s L s , or equivalently 0 q s ln(l), where l = B B+DD BB+DD . Because the value of the rm is lower than the post-LBO default boundary, the LBO is not consummated, the default boundary is not increased, and the rm subsequently defaults when q t hits 0. Paths of Type C, lead to a successful LBO transaction at s and a subsequent default when q t hits ln(l) prior to T. The only remaining possibility (event D) is that the LBO oer does not arrive prior to the maturity of debt, and the probability of the rm defaulting is simply the probability of defaulting prior to T without any c hange in the default barrier. given by (18). Now using the Feynman-Kac solution of the bond price as in Lemma 2 yields (14).
Proof of Lemma 6.
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The amount to be shared by equity holders and putable bondholders if a settlement is successfully negotiated is given by v K P = V t B K P ( r P ; T ) B P K B ; where B K T is provided in Lemma 4. For convenience, the arguments of the price and bankruptcy cost functions have been omitted. The amount to be shared by these players in an immediate reorganization is given by E P F + D P F = (1 ) V t B P F ; which equals (1 ) V t B f B P ( r P ; T ) (59) under Condition 1 (senior bank debt is paid in full if the junior debt has non-zero recovery). For situations L and U the proof is straightforward: Using Lemma 2, the value of resources in continuation equal V t B K t P ( r P ; T ) B f B P ( r P ; T ) [ 1 + ( q t ; t ; T ) ( B 1) ]; (60) where q t = Vt L t for K = L, and q t = Vt t for K = U. Because future expected bankruptcy costs in situation K are simply equal to times the default boundary, and the rm is currently solvent ( V t > t for K = U or V t > L t for K = L) its current bankruptcy costs (if it fails immediatley) exceed future expected bankrputcy costs | or V P F > B K P . Condition 1 implies that the value of bank debt (in continuation) is lower than B f B P ( r P ; T ), the amount to be paid to bankholders immediately. Therefore, the quantity in (60) exceeds the quantity in (59).
When K = P | when the LBO oer has not yet arrived | and when V P L P , the same logic as for the above cases applies. The case left to consider is when L P > V P > P . Under the risk-neutral measure Q, no-arbitrage implies that the value of the rm's assets must satisfy V P = [ P ( V P P ; P ; T ) C ( V P P ; P ; T ) ] t + C ( V t t ; t ; T ) L t + P ( r P ; T ) E Q [ V T j Firm is solvent]:
Since the last term is positive, V P [ P ( V P P ; P ; T ) C ( V P P ; P ; T ) ] t + C ( V t t ; t ; T ) L t :
Since bankruptcy costs are proportional to the value of the rm's assets at bankruptcy, current bankruptcy costs are larger than expected future bankruptcy costs, and the same steps as for the other cases apply.
Proof of Result 1.
Following Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) we dene the function V K P (), that assigns a subset V (S) K P of R S to every coalition S I. When all players are risk-neutral then the set V K P (S) = fc 2 R S : Proof of Lemma 7.
We will show that the marginal value of player i in any coaliton exceeds D i f B P(r P ; T ). Under Condition 1, (26) and (27) 
and Lemma 6 implies that the last quantity exceeds D i f D P(r P ; T ).
Proof of Lemma 8. The option pays o when the rm's credit rating hits speculative grade | which b y Assumption 8 sets lower bounds on the value of the rm's assets in situation K, K = P; L; U. The security therefore pays the value f K (V P ) at the time of exercise of the super poison put option, P . Let E be the event that the rm's rating hits speculative grade before the LBO arrival. The density of a downgrade at at time s is given by r 0 (m 0 ; 0; s ), upon which the security p a ys f P (V P;s ). The probability of no LBO by s is e s .
Recalling that the LBO process is independent of the asset value and integrating the present discounted value for s 2 [0; T implies (48).
Let F be the event that the rm's rating has always remained above speculative grade until the time of the LBO, but because of an insucient rm value the LBO does not go through; subsequently the rating drops to speculative grade when V hits V U;P at P . The LBO is not consummated if the normalized value of the rm's assets is in (v P ; l ); the transition density of this event is p r (q 0 ; y ; 0 ; s ). Subsequently the rm's normalized rating boundary is lowered to v U and another appeal to the spatial homogeneity o f Brownian Motion implies that the density of a rating downgrade after the LBO is r 0 (y + v U v L ; s ; t . Now using the density of LBO arrival and integrating provides the expression for (49) .
Let G be the event that the rm's rating turns from investment to speculative grade at the time of LBO. This happens if the normalized if the rms value is in [l;v L ]; the lower bound ensures that the LBO is consummated, and the upper that the rm's rating immediately turns to speculative grade | leading to an immediate payo of the security. The actual value of the rm's assets is e y l P ( r t ; T ). Now performing the integration as for the other events yields (50). The last possibility is that the LBO is consummated Source: Moody's (1997).
but the rm's rating remaines investment grade; this happens if the rm's normalized value is above v L .
Subsequently, the rm's rating turns speculative grade after the rms value hits the upper rating boundary. Since this raises the rating boundary another appeal to spatial homogeneity implies that the subsequent density of the rating downgrade is r`( y (v U v P ); 0; s ; t ). Again performing an integration over t 2 [0; T ] yields (51). The market value of assets in the example is $45b. 20 is the 20-year probability of default starting with the asset value as shown. The options payo when the ratings decline to Ba on Moody's rating scale, which usually corresponds to a 20-year probability of default of 37.8%. For each dierent , the v K , for K = P; L; U are calculated to imply this probability of default when the asset value in situation K hits v K . The merger series in the top panels represent the majority ( > 50 %) acquisition of public and private U.S. nonnancial companies. The dark portion in the top right panel represents the equity of the target company retired as a result of the acquisition; the remainder of the deal value was paid in the stock of the acquirer. The number and the deal value of nonnancial targets that were acquired by either LBO rms or private investor groups are shown in the middle panels. Funds raised by non-venture private equity i n v estors | which include specialist LBO rms | are shown in the bottom left panel. The face value of Poison Put bonds issued in the 1990s is shown in the bottom right panel. The rm defaults on all its liabilities when the value of its assets, Vt, hits the stochastic boundary t, given in (6) | or equivalently when qt ln Vt t hits zero. If the rm is purchased in a LBO transaction, the boundary is increased to L t , given in (7). The time of the LBO is stochastic; in the gure it is assumed that the LBO oer arrives at time The rm's rating hits speculative grade in the situation K when the value of its assets, Vt, hits the stochastic rating boundary V K t , for K P L U | or equivalently qt = l n V t P r t ;T hits v K . When the rm's value hits this lower bound the probability of defaulting at dierent time horizons matches the default rate of Ba-rated rms by Moody's. The value of a security that pays the value f (V P ) can be written as the sum of its values in four mutually exclusive events, i.e. P0(f ) = P E 0 (f) + P F 0 ( f ) + P G 0 ( f ) + P H 0 ( f ). In event E, the rm's rating hits speculative grade before the LBO arrival. In event F , the rm's rating remains above speculative grade until the time of the LBO, but because of an insucient rm value, the LBO does not go through; subsequently, the rating drops to speculative grade when fqtg hits v U . In event G, the rm's rating turns from investment to speculative grade at the time of LBO. This happens if the normalized rm value is in [ln(l); v L ]; the lower bound ensures that the LBO is consummated, and the upper that the rm's rating immediately turns to speculative grade | leading to an immediate payo of the security. Under event H, the rm's rating remains investment grade until the LBO arrival, the LBO is consummated but the rm's rating remains investment grade; this happens if the rm's normalized value is above v L . Subsequently, the rm's rating turns speculative grade after fqtg hits v L .
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